Explaining brain size variation: from social to cultural brain by van Schaik, C P et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2012
Explaining brain size variation: from social to cultural brain
van Schaik, C P; Isler, K; Burkart, J M
Abstract: Unspecified
DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2012.04.004
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-65158
Published Version
Originally published at:
van Schaik, C P; Isler, K; Burkart, J M (2012). Explaining brain size variation: from social to cultural
brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(5):277-284. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2012.04.004
Explaining brain size variation:
from social to cultural brain
Carel P. van Schaik, Karin Isler and Judith M. Burkart
Anthropological Institute & Museum, University of Zurich, Winterthurerstrasse 190, CH-8057 Zurich, Switzerland
Although the social brain hypothesis has found near-
universal acceptance as the best explanation for the
evolution of extensive variation in brain size among
mammals, it faces two problems. First, it cannot account
for grade shifts, where species or complete lineages
have a very different brain size than expected based
on their social organization. Second, it cannot account
for the observation that species with high socio-cogni-
tive abilities also excel in general cognition. These pro-
blems may be related. For birds and mammals, we
propose to integrate the social brain hypothesis into a
broader framework we call cultural intelligence, which
stresses the importance of the high costs of brain tissue,
general behavioral flexibility and the role of social learn-
ing in acquiring cognitive skills.
The social brain
It has long been known that various mammalian and bird
lineages differ in brain size, relative to body size [1,2]. The
most widely accepted explanation is known as the Machi-
avellian intelligence [3] or social brain hypothesis [4].
Developed to explain variation order in relative brain size
among mammalian orders and within primates, the hy-
pothesis argues that large brains are adaptations for deal-
ing with the complexities of social life. Several studies have
documented the remarkably sophisticated understanding
of the social world in primates [5], as well as some birds [6].
Although the originally used adjective ‘Machiavellian’
seemed to stress the competitive aspects of social life,
the hypothesis equally applies to cooperative aspects, such
as social learning, cooperation and coordination [7,8].
The social brain hypothesis is also consistent with the
unusually large brain size of humans. In contrast to all
other nonhuman primates, humans have evolved novel
socio-cognitive abilities that build on a fully-fledged theory
of mind and specialized social learning skills [9]. They arise
early in ontogeny [10] and precede the development of
physical and spatial cognitive abilities [11]. The most
important among these abilities is language, which criti-
cally relies on shared intentionality, cooperative commu-
nicative intent and the attribution of mental states to
others [12].
Broad comparative analyses support a prominent role of
social interactions in the evolution of cognition in primates,
other mammals and birds. The relative size of a species’
brain or neocortex is correlated with the size of its social
network [13] or the presence of coalitions and strong social
bonds, including intrasexual pair bonds [8,14]. Indeed,
being able to establish and maintain close social bonds
is adaptive [15–17]. Consequently, mammalian lineages
with stable social groups have shown far steeper increases
in brain size over time than solitary ones [14,18].
Despite this compelling support for the social brain
hypothesis, two significant problems remain. First, it does
not explain the existence of grade shifts, in that some
lineages exhibit equally high socio-cognitive abilities with
much smaller brains, both within primates [19] and other
mammals [20], and most spectacularly, fish [21]. Second,
recent studies suggest that primates and some other
organisms show evidence for general intelligence, and it
is not immediately obvious how selection on modular
cognitive abilities (i.e., abilities limited to a specific do-
main) could have produced more general cognitive abili-
ties. We will discuss these problems below and suggest that
they are related. We then consider a broader hypothesis for
birds and primates that encompasses the social brain
hypothesis.
Grade shifts and the social brain
For some species or lineages, the social brain hypothesis
does a poor job of predicting their brain size. On the one
hand, orangutans (Pongo spp.) or aye-ayes (Daubentonia
madagascariensis) live in socially simple societies but none-
theless have larger brains than related primates living in far
more complex societies [19]. On the other hand, some rela-
tively small-brained taxonomic groups have better socio-
cognitive abilities than expected on the basis of their brain
size, a phenomenon known as grade shifts. For instance,
lemurs achieve similar social complexity at smaller brain
size than monkeys [13,22]. Comparisons of primates with
other lineages provide more striking examples. Spotted
hyenas (Crocuta crocuta) are relatively small-brained but
show socio-cognitive abilities and a social organization very
similar to that of the baboons with whom they coexist [20],
and even tiny-brained Bechstein bats (Myotis bechsteinii)
manage to live in primate-like fission-fusion societies with
complex relationship dynamics [23]. When the comparison
is extended to non-mammal and non-bird species, the dis-
crepancies become even more marked. Several small fish
species show socio-cognitive abilities rivaling those of pri-
mates [21,24], despite having relatively minute brains.
(Because the fish case can be linked to the modularity
debate, its discussion is postponed until the next section.)
Traditionally, cognitive abilities are estimated using
relative brain sizes, which are obtained by removing the
effects of body size on brain size by taking residuals from
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an empirical regression curve or calculating encephalization
quotients (a measure of relative brain size defined as the
ratio between actual brain mass and predicted brain mass)
[1]. Recent work, however, suggests that only a modest
correction for body size is warranted [25,26]. Nevertheless,
regardless of whether we use absolute or relative brain
size, these grade shifts remain striking. Why, therefore,
are some taxa systematically larger- or smaller-brained
than expected based on the social brain hypothesis?
This could of course merely indicate that non-social
challenges exist as well. Indeed, recent primate data sug-
gest that ecological challenges are also important. These
range from the ever-changing distribution of resources,
which requires orientation and spatio-temporal memory
abilities and some degree of planning of range use [27,28],
to technical aspects of foraging, including tool use
[19,29,30], to the presence of complex anti-predator strat-
egies [31]. However, among primates these non-social
cognitive abilities are mostly found in the same species
that excel in the socio-cognitive ones [26,32], and thus do
not explain much additional variation.
Grade shifts in the relative brain size of birds and
mammals can be explained in at least two ways. First,
there may be physical constraints on the size of brains.
These may reflect the need for morphological integration of
the cranium and the masticatory apparatus, but probably
the most common one is imposed by small body size.
Because brain size shows negative allometry (that is, a
less than isometric relationship of brain size to shape,
anatomy and physiology) [1], in small-bodied species the
brain constitutes a larger proportion of body mass, which
implies that space is limited for both sense organs and
brains [33]. Other constraints may be more particular.
Bats have fairly small brains and it has been argued that
they are under strong energetic constraints due to high
costs of flight [34].
The second explanation for the presence of grade shifts
in brain size refers to the fact that brains are energetically
so expensive that organisms may have difficulty garnering
the energy needed to maintain themselves [33,35,36]. This
argument is part of a more general explanation that
invokes the presence of a life-history filter for cognitive
adaptation [35]. This filter (see legend of Figure 1) is a
result of the high energetic and developmental costs of
brains. To clarify why this should be the case, we must first
consider selection on larger brain size, which in turn
explains why the costs of larger brains must be met
through changes in life history.
Natural selection favors an increase in the size of some
organ if this increases lifetime reproductive success by
Box 1. How organisms pay for increased brain size
The high energy costs of brains mean that increased encephalization
from a given ancestral state is possible only when extra energy is
made available. This can be achieved along two fundamental,
complementary pathways [64]: a stable increase in energy inputs
(i.e. an increase in the mean, a reduction in the variance, or both) and
redirection of energy away from other functions without any change
in the overall net energy intake (Figure I). With respect to the first
pathway, increased energy inputs correlated with brain enlargement
have been found to come from allomaternal care [65], a richer diet or
more effective foraging strategies (e.g. [66]), or from cognitive
buffering [67] of environmental seasonality [68]. As expected, the
species involved show a positive correlation between basal metabolic
rate and brain size in placental [69] and marsupial [65] mammals.
Concerning the second pathway, among the various possibilities
(cf. [70]), only the tradeoff between brain size and ‘production’ (the
combination of growth and reproduction) is empirically supported
[64,70,71]. Reflecting this tradeoff, larger-brained mammals mostly
have slower development [70,72].
Regardless of the pathway, for selection to favor a brain size
increase, the latter must improve adult survival, reproduction, or
both. In practice, we usually see lower rates of reproduction [70,73],
perhaps largely because larger-brained species have heavier neo-
nates [70]. The alternative, a compensatory increase in adult lifespan,
is confirmed by many studies [70,74,75]. Consequently, because
unavoidable mortality ultimately determines adult lifespan [39], the
external conditions (predation, disease, seasonality) must allow for
such an increase in adult lifespan. Otherwise, selection cannot favor a
brain size increase.
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Figure I. The major pathways followed by evolution to pay for the increased costs when brains get bigger (after [64,70]).
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improving the rate of survival or reproduction. Strictly
speaking, of course, this is a net improvement, after the
costs of the increase have been met. Normally, we can
ignore these costs, but in the case of brain tissue they are
not trivial, because brain tissue is energetically costly to
maintain in terms of calories per unit weight and time,
especially when it is still growing and differentiating.
Moreover, its energy needs cannot be temporarily reduced
[37,38], preventing a flexible resource allocation over time
as is possible for other functions or tissues, such as somatic
growth or muscle.
Empirical data show that these energetic and life-
history costs of increased brain size are mainly met through
an increase in adult lifespan (Box 1). This finding provides a
second explanation for the presence of grade shifts in rela-
tive brain size. Natural selection will gradually turn
improved adult survival into slower-paced life history
[39], but only if high unavoidable mortality imposed by
another factor does not prevent it. It is therefore possible
that those lineages that do not have larger brains were
unable to translate the potential cognitive benefits into
sufficiently improved survival because external factors kept
unavoidable mortality at a high level by acting as a life-
history filter (Figure 1). Where this happens, brains remain
stuck at a particular size, even if potential cognitive benefits
would accrue from increased brain size. This problem is
probably unique to brains because in other traits, the costs of
development and maintenance are not so acute.
Here, we highlight two possible causes of the operation of
a life-history filter. First, because brains have constant and
high energy needs, seasonality may constrain the evolution
of larger brains. Cognitive buffering of fluctuations in food
availability, such as the flexible switching between different
resources, may be impossible where seasonality is too se-
vere. Thus, lemurs may be condemned to be small-brained
due to the presence of an extreme lean season in Madagas-
car, with the telling exception of the large-brained aye-aye,
which extracts larvae from wood and experiences virtually
no seasonality [40]. Second, predation may be unavoidable
for small species that have many large predators. (Note that
the body-size effect mentioned above may be compounded by
this life-history effect.) Because primates, including apes,
have a long history of arboreality and were thus subject to
lower predation rates than terrestrial mammals of similar
body size [35,41], they could afford to evolve larger brains.
Thus, the life-history filter produces grade shifts because
environmental conditions that determine unavoidable
mortality prevent potential improvements due to cognitive
solutions from being expressed.
The idea that small body size or fast life history impose
limitations on brain size implicitly assumes that most
lineages would benefit from increasing cognitive abilities,
be they domain-specific or -general. This is not implausible
because most species do not simply respond to ecological or
social challenges but in part create them as well through
niche construction [42]. The life-history filter also provides
the best available answer yet to the age-old question why
the majority of species are not ‘clever’ when they would
derive such obvious benefits from it.
The presence of a filter due to body size or life history,
and hence grade shifts, per se is not incompatible with the
social brain hypothesis. However, what is incompatible is
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Figure 1. The life-history filter illustrated for 10 different lineages (L1 through L10)
sorted by rate of unavoidable mortality. Cognitive challenges, regardless of
domain, may give rise to cognitive adaptations only to the extent that unavoidable
mortality allows the slowdown in life-history pace required to support the requisite
increase in brain size.
Box 2. General intelligence in nonhumans
The observation that in humans performance across very different
cognitive domains is correlated (the positive manifold) and that one
single factor can explain a significant amount of this variation, is
recognized in the term ‘general intelligence’ or ‘g’. The latter is highly
heritable in humans, with genetic differences accounting for 40% –
50% of variance [76,77], correlated with brain size [78] and a variety
of life outcomes, such as school achievement, occupational attain-
ment, job performance and even health and survival (see [79], for a
review). Psychologically, g can be linked to processes such as the
size of working memory, attention span, processing speed and
inhibitory control over responses (for a review, see [76]). The
presence of g does not imply that individuals may not have cognitive
domains in which they show particular strengths or weaknesses, but
such individual differences in broad cognitive domains contribute a
small amount of variance compared with g [79]. Indeed, the role of g
is so pervasive that attempts to identify specific cognitive abilities
neurobiologically often have to control statistically for its confound-
ing effect [76].
Although domain-general cognitive abilities are often considered
unique to humans, they are not. Across primate species, comparative
studies have found that the performance of individual species on
different cognitive tasks, involving aspects of spatial, physical and
social cognition, is highly correlated [25,26,32,80], suggesting the
presence of a general factor underlying this variation. They have also
found that this general cognitive performance is correlated quite
strongly with brain size, corrected slightly for the effects of body size
[25,26]. Similar intraspecific studies on cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus
oedipus) support the notion of general intelligence [81], whereas
results on chimpanzees also agree if we accept the finding [82] that
spatial cognition is on a separate dimension. Domain-general cognitive
abilities may be even more widespread in the animal kingdom and also
occur in other mammals and birds [83–85]. They are particularly well
documented in rodents, which also provide some insight into the
evolutionary continuity of the mechanism. For instance, like in humans,
g-factors extracted in rodent studies covary with efficacy in selective
attention and working memory capacity [86,87].
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the fact that species living in simple social systems, such as
orangutans, aye-ayes or bears [20] have large brains. Thus,
we need a hypothesis that can also explain the second kind
of grade shifts.
Domain-specific or domain-general cognitive abilities?
The second problem with the social brain hypothesis is the
growing evidence for a non-modular, general intelligence:
an overarching ability to respond flexibly to new or complex
situations, to learn and to innovate. Studies reviewed in
Box 2 support the idea that general intelligence is not a
uniquely derived human trait but instead a phylogeneti-
cally old phenomenon, found among primates, rodents and
birds.
Parallel emergence of abilities in multiple domains is
not explained by the social brain hypothesis or any other
hypothesis focusing on the adaptive benefits of cognitive
performance in a single domain unless selection on any
domain-specific ability automatically produces general
cognitive abilities [13,43]. However, we know that this is
not universally true, as shown by the existence of modular
abilities, such as food caching in birds, tactical deception in
small fishes, tool use in ants or social communication in
bees [21,44]. Moreover, if it were true, we would never
know in which domain selection has favored the cognitive
abilities. Worse, we would not even know whether the
initial selection was on domain-specific cognitive abilities
or on domain-general ones.
More plausible, therefore, is the idea that selection
actually favored domain-general cognitive abilities that
could be applied to whichever problems a developing indi-
vidual would face. Applying such abilities predominantly
in one domain, say social cognition, may lead to automati-
zation of skills. This process could be called secondary
modularization because it produces many of the features
commonly associated with modules rather than domain-
general reasoning, such as fast and frugal processing and
independence of reasoning. In humans, this idea is rela-
tively uncontroversial, since no one would suggest that we
have an evolved module for driving a car or playing chess
[45]. However, some evidence suggests automatization
may also occur in nonhumans. Thus, in primates, a marked
difference in tool use ability between wild and captive
populations is well documented, in some species to the
point that tool use has been exclusively documented in
captivity [29,46]. Yet, once proficient, such individuals
show tool use with high degrees of automatization.
Secondary modularization is also supported by plastic
changes in the brain, such as the changes in gray matter
content of parts of the neocortex of rhesus monkeys in
response to changes in social group size [47].
Domain-general cognitive abilities and domain-specific
socio-cognitive abilities can, of course, coexist in the same
species. This raises the question how their relative impor-
tance varies taxonomically. It seems reasonable to assume
that small-brained organisms cannot afford to support
domain-general cognitive abilities. Indeed, evidence avail-
able so far is consistent with the idea that invertebrates
and poikilothermic vertebrates, with relatively smaller
brains [1,33,36,48], do not show much of them [21]. On
the other hand, domain-general abilities are found in both
birds and mammals, whose brains are an order of magni-
tude larger for their body size than those of fishes, amphi-
bians or reptiles [33,36]. Thus, one could speculate that the
major expansion of integrative brain structures, and thus
large brain size [49], which arose independently in these
lineages, was at least partly linked to the addition of a
domain-general learning and action-planning ability.
We expect that most birds and mammals have a mix of
secondary modularization and classic modularity, with
innate preferences for particular kinds of input, indepen-
dent from other learning or attention processes [44].
Variation among great ape species in innovation and prob-
lem-solving biases illustrates this. Thus, bonobos bias their
innovations, including those involving tool use, more to-
ward solving social problems, chimpanzees more toward
solving subsistence problems, and orangutans more to-
ward enhancing physical comfort [50–53]. These divergent
biases are found in the wild, but also in captivity, where
conditions are uniform across the species concerned.
We can now also offer another speculative but testable
explanation of some of the apparent grade shifts in the
relation between brain size and socio-cognitive abilities.
The more organisms rely on domain-specific socio-cognitive
adaptations, the more they may be able to perform these
tasks with relatively small brains. In extreme cases, do-
main-general abilities trained on socio-cognitive challenges
may be absent, such as perhaps in cleaner fishes [21],
whereas at the other extreme, perhaps, for instance, in
humans, the dedicated modules play a minor role. This
prediction can be tested by examining the species concerned
for evidence of domain-general cognitive abilities (Box 2).
A cultural rather than just social brain
The existence of domain-general cognitive abilities in larg-
er-brained birds and primates is incompatible with the
social brain hypothesis. However, it is entirely consistent
with Reader and Laland’s [32] proposal that general be-
havioral flexibility, not tied to any domain in particular (i.e.
content-neutral), is the adaptation underlying cognitive
performance in primates. For some reason, however, this
idea did not become as popular as the social brain hypoth-
esis, despite its strong explanatory power.
The behavioral flexibility hypothesis itself, however,
also faces an objection. A general problem-solving ability
may be adaptive by allowing initially naive individuals to
develop a set of customized skills to handle specific local
environmental challenges. However, it would be difficult
for selection to promote it beyond a fairly modest level. The
reason is that, in the absence of transmission to the next
generation through social learning, the invented skills will
merely provide a one-off fitness advantage to the inventor.
The rare innovations that reflect a species’ behavioral
flexibility [32] and allow it to cope with environmental
change [54] greatly improve fitness but are very unlikely to
arise again independently in the inventor’s offspring.
Worse, even routine foraging, parenting or mating skills
shown by any normal adult of a given species are often not
spontaneously invented by maturing individuals, and only
acquired when they are exposed to role models (for a
review, see [55]). Innovations must therefore be made
heritable by social learning [55].
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Social learning, favored by kin selection, goes beyond
making innovations heritable. It is also a much faster and
much more reliable way of acquiring solutions than asocial
exploration and learning, making it an energetically vastly
more efficient use of expensive brain tissue. Finally, selec-
tion on more effective techniques of social learning also
automatically improves the asocial learning ability be-
cause of the high cognitive overlap between the two [56].
This overlap also ensures correlated evolution between
innovative and social-learning abilities. These ideas derive
from the cultural intelligence hypothesis [7,55,57]. The
hypothesis proposes that general cognitive ability, and
thus brain size, can increase where association with toler-
ant role models is sufficiently high that skills of any kind
can be learned faster and innovative skills be learned at all.
It combines elements of the behavioral flexibility [26,32]
and Vygotskian intelligence hypotheses [58,60] that
emerged alongside the social brain hypothesis (see also
[59]). It proposes a content-neutral (domain-general) ad-
aptation to learn skills socially and thus also asocially, at
least for larger birds and mammals. The learned skills
acquired can be social, ecological or spatial, even though in
Box 3. Cultural intelligence in nonhumans?
Cultural intelligence refers to the developmental construction of
general learning abilities and cognitive skills (potentially biased
toward particular domains). This construction takes place under the
influence of social role models, who structure attention and serve as
imitation targets, possibly in interaction with innate preferences for
particular kinds of inputs of varying content and strength in different
species. It is therefore a Vygotskian perspective [58] applied to
nonhuman animals.
The cultural intelligence hypothesis largely predicts the same
interspecific patterns in brain size as the social brain hypothesis,
but it alone predicts that cognitive abilities, proxied by brain size,
should reflect the duration of availability or the number of tolerant
role models for social learning. As shown in Figure I, a first round of
empirical testing [55] supported this prediction for birds and solitary
carnivorous mammals.
Also consistent with the cultural intelligence hypothesis is work
showing variation in space and time in primate cognitive skills among
nonhuman species, reflecting the role of social learning in acquiring
cognitive skills:
 Cultural variation among wild populations of great apes in
cognitively complex skills [7,88].
 Major differences between captive and wild primates in the nature
of cognitive competence [89–92].
 An effect of rearing conditions on cognitive performance in
different domains (see [55,93], for reviews).
 An effect of previous cultural experience on the ability to solve
specific problems [94,95].
 The finding that even routine skills, such as nest building or
mothering behavior, are acquired through social learning (see [55],
for a review).
 A major effect of cultural and educational differences on brain
structure in apes and rodents [96], just as in humans [97].
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Figure I. (a) Mean values of residual (observed minus expected on the basis of body mass) brain size for species in precocial bird families (N=14) as a function of the
mean number of protectors after hatching, and thus opportunities for social learning. The correlation is significant ( p = 0.009; r2 = 0.447). Family means are used,
because in birds variation in brain size is found mainly at this level [98]. Data from Karin Isler’s database compiled from numerous sources (especially [99–103]). (b)
Mean values of residual (observed minus expected on the basis of body mass) brain size for species in altricial bird families (N=42) as a function of the residual duration
of post-fledging association with parents, and thus opportunities for social learning. The correlation is significant ( p=0.007; r2=0.171). (c) Residual brain size of solitary
carnivore species (N=45) as a function of the residual of the duration of post-weaning association with the mother, which reflects the frequency of opportunities for
social skill learning. The correlation is significant for species values ( p=0.004) and remains so for independent contrasts ( p=0.02). Data from compilations [104,105].
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many species the skills acquired socially may have a
content bias toward the social domain.
Grade shifts can still arise, of course, and for the same
reasons as discussed above. However, an additional cause
now also comes into play: variation in the frequency of
opportunities for social transmission across generations.
Indeed, this is one way to distinguish the cultural intelli-
gence hypothesis from the social brain hypothesis, with
which it shares virtually all other predictions because
social life also allows skill learning that is socially mediat-
ed through association, observation or interaction. Unique-
ly, the cultural intelligence hypothesis predicts that
animals that do not live in stable social groups as adults,
but in which immatures associate with adults, should also
be able to have evolved larger brains. Box 3 presents an
empirical test confirming this prediction [55] and reviews
other phenomena consistent with this hypothesis.
This idea is also consistent with what we know about
human intelligence, and thus parsimoniously assumes
evolutionary continuity between humans and nonhumans
(Box 2). Indeed, cultural intelligence can also account for
the unusual brain size increase in human evolution, where
high social tolerance turned into active skill transmission,
engendered by the adoption of cooperative breeding and
the evolution of teaching [61,62]. Thus, a positive feedback
cycle arose, in which ever-growing reliance on technologi-
cal subsistence skills transmitted across generations se-
lected for improved social-learning abilities and thus
indirectly for improved innovative abilities [63].
Concluding remarks
In conclusion, we noted two weaknesses in the social brain
hypothesis: it cannot account for the presence of domain-
general cognitive abilities in birds and mammals, and it
leaves grade shifts in brain size unexplained.
Unexplained grade shifts can have thee causes. First,
some filter (e.g., due to small body size or high unavoidable
mortality) may prevent the evolution of a larger brain, even
though selection would in principle favor improved socio-
cognitive abilities. Second, the taxon’s high socio-cognitive
abilities are entirely or largely based on domain-specific
socio-cognitive adaptations, which may hardly affect over-
all brain size. We speculated that animals without domain-
general cognitive abilities are mainly small-brained, per-
haps because they are affected by such filters. Third, some
have large brains despite living in simple societies.
The cultural intelligence hypothesis recognizes that in
some lineages domain-general cognitive abilities evolved
that could be trained especially on socio-cognitive chal-
lenges, in addition to the specialized cognitive adaptations
already present. In these animals, maturing individuals
acquire vital cognitive skills, be they social or ecological,
through social learning. This idea makes many of the same
predictions as the social brain hypothesis but can also ac-
count for the third kind ofgradeshifts leftunexplained bythe
latter. Obviously, it applies only to those species where
domain-general cognitive abilities are well developed.
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